Luigi Carfora: When a Strategic Asset Changes Hands. What Will the Strategic Assets of Tomorrow Be?

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📁 Enterprise Visions

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By Luigi Carfora
President, Confimi Industria Campania
President, Consorzio Suggestioni Campane Promotion

On 8 May 2026, SOCAR, Azerbaijan's state-owned energy company, announced the completion of the acquisition of 99.82% of Italiana Petroli (IP) from API Holding, following the completion of the required regulatory approvals. The transaction had been announced on 23 September 2025, when SOCAR announced the signing of the agreement for the acquisition.

This is not the sale of an ordinary company. Italiana Petroli has more than ninety years of industrial history and operates an integrated system that includes two refineries, storage facilities, logistics infrastructure and a nationwide distribution network. In 2026, the company reports a network of 4,575 service stations, together with supply and distribution activities serving, among others, Italian airports and ports.

It is therefore understandable that the transaction has reopened a discussion about the ownership of Italy's energy assets and, more broadly, about the progressive loss of national control over important parts of our industrial heritage.

This is where my reflection begins.

In my view, the issue cannot be addressed simply by asking whether it is positive or negative for a major Italian energy company to come under the control of a foreign group. The question is broader and concerns the way in which Italy has interpreted, over several decades, the relationship between the market, industry, capital and the national interest.

The transfer of important Italian companies and industrial assets to foreign ownership did not begin with Italiana Petroli. Over the past decades, Italy has experienced a long period of privatisations, disposals and changes in ownership that have profoundly altered the role of the State in the economy and the structure of the national industrial system.

I do not believe, however, that the answer can be to regard every foreign investment as a threat or to argue that the State should necessarily own every major company. A modern economy needs private capital, international investment and companies capable of competing in global markets.

The issue is different: can an industrial country afford not to have a long-term vision of its industrial, energy and technological interests?

This is why I still consider relevant an approach to economic policy in which the State is not merely an observer of the market, nor intervenes only to correct its imbalances, but retains responsibility for guiding investment, supporting research and innovation, strengthening the competitiveness of companies and protecting interests that concern the country's economic and strategic security.

This does not necessarily mean that the State must own everything. It means that it must be able to determine which interests are strategic, which assets need to be protected and which new assets need to be built.

It is precisely from this consideration that, when looking at the sale of Italiana Petroli, my interpretation differs from the one that automatically regards every disposal of a major national asset as a loss.

Are we really sure that it was a mistake?

This question is not intended to defend the transaction, nor does it deny the broader problem of the progressive loss of national ownership of important industrial activities. We do not have sufficient public evidence to claim that the sale of Italiana Petroli was conceived by API Holding as a strategy to reallocate capital towards other sectors.

But we can ask a question that I consider much more interesting from the perspective of industrial policy: will an asset that has been strategically important to our country for many decades necessarily retain the same strategic relevance in the world we are now building?

The question becomes particularly important when we look at the future of hydrocarbons.

Oil and gas will continue to play an important role in the global economy for many years. It would be neither serious nor realistic to suggest otherwise. The issue, however, is not whether we will stop using oil and gas tomorrow morning. The issue is whether their relative weight and strategic function are destined to change, particularly within the European industrial system.

The European Union has developed an energy and industrial policy framework that is progressively moving in this direction. REPowerEU aims to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels, diversify sources of supply, accelerate clean-energy production and strengthen Europe's energy security. The European Commission also identifies industrial decarbonisation, renewable energy and investment in energy infrastructure among the central elements of this transformation.

The change is also particularly evident in the automotive sector. Under the current European regulatory framework, new cars and vans are subject to a target of 0 grams of CO₂ per kilometre from 2035, corresponding to a 100% reduction in tailpipe emissions compared with the regulatory reference framework. The European Commission presents this objective as part of the wider decarbonisation of road transport and the transition towards zero-emission mobility.

This does not mean that vehicles with internal-combustion engines already on the road will disappear in 2035, nor that oil will suddenly lose all its value. It does mean, however, that the European mobility market and a significant part of European industrial policy are progressively shifting their centre of gravity towards technologies that reduce dependence on fossil fuels.

This direction is also reflected in the European Commission's more recent initiatives. In July 2026, the Commission presented a plan to accelerate the electrification of the European economy, with the objective of increasing the level of electrification from the current 23% to 46% by 2040. The Commission explicitly links this transformation to reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels and increasing Europe's resilience to geopolitical shocks.

This, in my view, is the point we need to consider when discussing strategic assets.

Energy will not lose its strategic importance. What will change is the nature of the energy that will be strategic.

And this distinction is fundamental.

If the future European energy system is increasingly characterised by electrification, renewable sources, energy storage, hydrogen, smart grids, efficiency and new energy technologies, then we must ask whether the concept of a strategic energy asset can continue to be identified primarily with refineries, fuels and infrastructure built around hydrocarbons.

This is not an abstract question.

It directly concerns Italy's and Europe's energy sovereignty.

Energy sovereignty cannot simply mean owning a refinery or an energy infrastructure. It means having the ability to secure sufficient, reliable and competitive energy over time while reducing vulnerabilities arising from excessive dependence on external resources and suppliers.

And this is precisely the transformation we need to consider when looking at the sale of Italiana Petroli.

Perhaps, before concluding that we have simply lost a strategic asset, we should first understand which energy assets will actually be strategic in the industrial system that is taking shape before us.

The future, however, will not require less energy. It is very likely to require more. The development of artificial intelligence, data centres, advanced robotics, automated factories, electric mobility and increasingly digital infrastructures is generating growing demand for energy, but also for energy that is reliable, continuously available and competitively priced.

This is one of the apparent paradoxes of the transition now under way. Europe is seeking to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, while the technological and industrial transformation accompanying that transition will require increasing amounts of electricity. We are therefore not moving towards an economy in which energy becomes less important. We are moving towards an economy in which energy becomes even more important, but where the way it is produced, managed and distributed will change substantially.

Artificial intelligence is a particularly clear example. AI systems require increasingly powerful computing infrastructure and, consequently, data centres capable of operating continuously. The European Commission has recognised the energy requirements of AI infrastructure as an important issue for Europe's future technological capacity and is working to strengthen computing capacity, digital infrastructure and the energy systems needed to support them.

The same applies to robotics. Cognitive robotics and what is increasingly described in Europe as physical AI represent the transition from intelligence that operates primarily in the digital environment to intelligence capable of interacting with the physical world. More autonomous industrial robots, collaborative systems and, increasingly, humanoid robots will require energy, computing capacity, communications networks and sophisticated infrastructure, as well as people capable of designing, integrating and governing these systems.

This means that the energy transition and the technological transformation should not be considered as two separate processes. They are increasingly becoming interdependent. New technologies will require growing amounts of energy, while the energy system itself will increasingly depend on artificial intelligence, automation, sensors, advanced control systems and intelligent networks in order to generate, store, distribute and use energy more efficiently.

This convergence is where I believe we should begin to identify the strategic assets of the future.

They will not simply be the facilities that generate energy. They will also include the technologies that allow energy to be produced more efficiently and from a more diversified range of sources, stored when necessary, distributed through intelligent networks and delivered where it is needed. Renewable-energy infrastructure, energy-storage systems, hydrogen technologies, electrification, electricity grids and the technologies required to make the energy system more flexible and resilient will therefore acquire increasing strategic importance.

At the same time, another category of strategic assets is emerging in the technological sphere: computing capacity, semiconductors, data, digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous systems and, above all, the skills required to develop and govern them. The European Commission is increasingly identifying AI-powered robotics and physical AI as relevant to industrial competitiveness and European technological sovereignty.

This is where energy sovereignty meets technological sovereignty.

A country can reduce its dependence on oil and gas, but if it becomes dependent on foreign suppliers for energy-storage technologies, semiconductors, computing capacity, artificial intelligence systems or critical digital infrastructure, it has not achieved genuine strategic autonomy. It has simply moved part of its dependence from one sector to another.

Future sovereignty, therefore, cannot be exclusively energy sovereignty or technological sovereignty. It must be industrial sovereignty, based on a country's ability to combine energy, technology, infrastructure, capital and skills within a competitive productive system.

This is why I do not believe that the debate surrounding the sale of Italiana Petroli can be reduced to the question of whether Italy has lost a refinery, a distribution network or a major national energy operator. The more important question is what Italy intends to do in response to the transformation that is taking place simultaneously in energy, mobility, manufacturing and technology.

If the sale of a mature asset simply means relinquishing industrial capacity without creating new capabilities, then the criticism of a mentality of disposal remains entirely justified. If, on the other hand, a change in ownership becomes part of a broader process in which capital, investment and entrepreneurial capabilities are redirected towards new sectors, technologies and markets, then the assessment necessarily becomes more complex.

In the case of Italiana Petroli, we do not have sufficient public evidence to claim that the acquisition by SOCAR was carried out with such a strategic objective. It would therefore be incorrect to present it as a declared strategy of capital reallocation.

We can, however, use this operation to raise a question that concerns the entire Italian industrial system:

Are we capable of transforming today's industrial capital into the strategic assets of tomorrow?

This question inevitably brings us back to the role of industrial policy.

The State does not necessarily need to own every strategic company, but it must have the capacity to identify the country's long-term strategic interests and create the conditions for the productive system to develop in line with them. This means supporting research, encouraging investment, strengthening infrastructure, developing skills and creating the conditions in which Italian capital can become a protagonist, rather than merely an object, of international industrial consolidation.

The question, therefore, is not simply whether we should choose between the State and the market. It is about understanding what relationship between public institutions, markets and businesses is necessary to build an industrial policy capable of looking beyond the immediate economic cycle.

This is where the reflection connects with Visioni di Impresa and with the concept of Generativity that I have been developing.

Generativity, in this perspective, does not simply mean producing something new. It means having the capacity to transform what we have inherited into something capable of creating value for those who come after us. It means considering capital, businesses, technology, knowledge and skills not merely as assets to be preserved, but as instruments through which new possibilities can be created.

Applied to industrial policy, this leads to a precise consequence. It is not enough to ask which assets we should defend. We must also be able to identify which assets we need to build, which skills we need to develop and which technologies must become part of our productive capacity.

The energy future will not be less important simply because it will be different. On the contrary, it will probably become even more important because it will have to support an economy that is increasingly electrified, digital and automated. At the same time, the technological future cannot exist without the energy required to power it.

The real challenge will therefore be to build a system in which energy, technology, infrastructure, businesses and human capital reinforce one another.

This, in my view, is the perspective through which we should also consider the Italiana Petroli transaction. We cannot simply say that Italy has lost a strategic asset, just as we cannot claim, without evidence, that its sale was itself a strategic move towards the future.

We can, however, ask a much more important question:

What will Italy do after the sale of an asset of the past?

If we continue simply to dispose of industrial assets without creating new capabilities, then the criticism of a mentality of disposal will remain entirely justified. If, instead, we are able to use capital, knowledge, industrial policy and entrepreneurial capacity to build new energy and technological assets, then a period of change could become the beginning of a new industrial phase.

This is the real question of sovereignty.

It is not only about who owns a refinery, a network or an infrastructure today. It is about who will be capable of producing tomorrow's energy, managing the networks through which it will be distributed, developing the technologies that will use it, building the artificial-intelligence and robotic systems that will transform production, and educating the people capable of governing all of this.

Ultimately, the question is not only which strategic assets are we losing, but which strategic assets will we be capable of generating.

This is perhaps where the discussion surrounding the sale of Italiana Petroli acquires its broader meaning. The future of industry will not be determined solely by our ability to preserve what we inherited from the past. It will depend on our ability to recognise, in time, what will become strategic and to build a new productive capacity around that understanding.

The future will not be less energy-intensive because it will be more technological. It will be more technological and, precisely for that reason, it will require more energy. But it will also require an energy system that is increasingly diversified, technologically advanced, resilient and less dependent on external resources and suppliers.

At the same time, competitiveness will increasingly depend on the ability to develop and govern artificial intelligence, robotics, digital infrastructure, computing capacity and human capital.

Energy and technology, therefore, should not be regarded as competing strategic priorities. They are increasingly two dimensions of the same industrial transformation.

The real challenge is to govern their convergence.

And this brings us back to the question with which we began.

Are we really sure that selling a strategic asset of the past was a mistake?

Or would the greater mistake be failing to develop a strategy capable of using the transformations of the present to build the strategic assets that Italy will need tomorrow?

Perhaps Italy's real challenge is not only to decide who should own today's strategic assets. It is to develop the vision, capital, skills and industrial policy necessary to generate tomorrow's strategic assets.

That is the challenge of a new energy sovereignty.

It is the challenge of technological sovereignty.

And ultimately, it is one of the great challenges facing Italian industrial policy.

Not simply to defend the present, but to have the vision and the capacity to generate the future.

Luigi Carfora
President, Confimi Industria Campania
President, Consorzio Suggestioni Campane Promotion

A reflection within the Visioni di Impresa project and on the paradigm of Generativity.